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ISBN 978-90-5833-458-9 Abstract in English
• • • • 
This paper analyzes whether information on high school quality published by a national 
newspaper affects school choice in the Netherlands. For this purpose, we use both school level 
and individual student level data. First, we study the causal effect of quality scores on the influx 
of new high school students using a longitudinal school dataset. We find that negative (positive) 
school quality scores decrease (increase) the number of students choosing a school after the 
year of publication. The positive effects are particularly large for the academic school track. An 
academic school track receiving the most positive score sees its inflow of students rise by 15 to 
20 students. Second, we study individual school choice behavior to address the relative 
importance of the quality scores, as well as potential differences in the quality response between 
socio-economic groups. Although the probability of attending a school is affected by its quality 
score, it is mainly driven by the traveling distance. Students are only willing to travel about 200 
meters more in order to attend a well-performing rather than an average school. In contrast to 
equity concerns that are often raised, we cannot find differences in information responses 
between socio-economic groups. 
 
Key words: School quality, school choice, information, media 
JEL code: I20, D10, D83 
Abstract in Dutch 
Deze studie gaat in op de vraag in hoeverre informatie over de meetbare kwaliteit van scholen   
en het Trouw-oordeel in het bijzonder   een rol speelt bij de keuze voor een middelbare school. 
Analyses met zowel scholen- als scholierengegevens geven aan dat de instroom van leerlingen 
daadwerkelijk afhangt van de beoordeling door Trouw. De effecten zijn het sterkst bij het VWO-
onderwijs. Hierbij leidt de meest positieve beoordeling tot tussen de 15 en 20 extra leerlingen, 
vergeleken met scholen in de middencategorie. De onderliggende oorzaak hiervan is niet dat 
huishoudens van VWO-leerlingen gemiddeld genomen uit hogere inkomensklassen komen. Per 
schooltype afzonderlijk reageren ouders en leerlingen uit de lagere inkomensklassen namelijk 
net zo sterk als die uit de hogere inkomensklassen. De geschatte effecten van het Trouw-oordeel 
op schoolkeuze zijn significant, maar reistijd is duidelijk belangrijker. Omgerekend wil een 
leerling maximaal 200 meter extra reizen om naar een school met een “+” te gaan in plaats van 
een school met slechts een “0”.  
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   6 Summary 
In this paper, we examine school choice responsiveness to information on high school quality 
published by a national newspaper (‘Trouw’). The paper uses unique data from the Netherlands 
to assess the empirical effect of publicly available school quality scores on school choice 
behavior. Our paper contributes to the literature by investigating how secondary school choice 
of students from all socio-economic groups in the Netherlands is affected by school quality 
information. The Netherlands presents an interesting setting to study the immediate effect of 
information on school choice. It is a densely populated country, so that within a ten kilometer 
radius a child can reach on average 11 relevant secondary schools. Negligible school fees, good 
public transport, and more importantly, unrestricted free school choice furthermore ensure that 
school choice reflects preferences more strongly than in countries with school catchment areas 
and heterogeneity in school fees.  
Our data are unique on several levels. Rather than focusing on accountability programs 
initiated by the government, we assess the influence of school rankings published yearly since 
1997 by national newspaper Trouw. Knowledge of these rankings among parents of children 
about to go to high school is relatively high, also because several regional newspapers copy the 
most relevant information for their readers into their issues. Trouw uses objective quality 
indicators from the Dutch Inspectorate for Education to calculate a final, overall quality score 
for each school track offered at each school. The newspaper corrects these scores for 
differences in the initial quality of students, by adjusting them for e.g. the percentage of 
children from cultural minorities. As in principle all secondary schools in the country feature in 
the Trouw publication, we can measure the effects of the quality scores on student inflow across 
the entire quality distribution of schools. By furthermore using country-wide administrative 
student records that include specific information on students’ home addresses, the relative 
importance of quality scores versus distance from home can be investigated as well. Finally, as 
our individual level dataset also includes detailed information on household income and 
composition, we can moreover draw conclusions on differences in the responsiveness to quality 
information between socio-economic groups.  
We draw complementary conclusions from both a longitudinal school level dataset and a 
cross-sectional individual level dataset. Using the school level dataset, we establish a causal 
effect of quality scores published by Trouw on the number of students entering a school in the 
year after publication. This effect can be interpreted as causal, as we control for school track 
fixed effects and exploit the substantial lag between the registration of quality indicators and 
their publication. It turns out that, as expected, negative school quality scores decrease the 
number of students choosing such schools, while positive quality scores significantly increase 
the inflow of students. Particularly, the positive effect is strongest for academic school tracks 
which prepare for university (‘VWO’). When Trouw qualifies the academic track of a school as 
most positive, the inflow of students increases by 16 to 18 students in the year after the   8 
publication. This is a substantial effect, given that the average school track cohort size is 76 
students. Presumably, the smartest and most ambitious students pay most attention to positive 
quality information.  
The results found in the analysis of individual school choice are in line with estimates 
obtained in the school level analysis. In particular, we use an administrative dataset of all first 
year secondary school students in the Netherlands to run conditional logit regressions on each 
student’s relevant geographical choice sets. As we observe the characteristics of the chosen 
school and of the relevant alternative options within 20 km of the home address, it is possible to 
identify the effects of school quality scores. We find that the probability to choose a school is 
mainly driven by the traveling distance and its distance rank order, but the probability of 
attending a school is also significantly affected by its quality score in the predicted way. The 
estimates furthermore enable us to compute the implied ‘willingness to travel’ to well-
performing schools, which reveals how important quality scores are relative to the traveling 
distance. This estimated willingness to travel turns out to be rather low. Students are only 
willing to travel about 220 meters more in order to attend a well-performing rather than an 
average scoring school.  
As in the school level analysis, students who attend an academic school track show the 
highest inclination to attend a well-performing school. This raises the question whether this 
difference in quality response is driven by differences in cognitive ability and ambition   which 
determine each student’s school track   or by socio-economic differences. As our dataset 
contains detailed household income and composition information, we can analyze this question 
in greater detail. In contrast to what those concerned with equity issues feared, no differences in 
quality response are found between socio-economic groups. The observed divergence in 
information response across school tracks can thus be attributed to variation in ability and 
ambition of the students attending. This suggests that at least within school tracks publicly 
available quality information does not increase inequity in the quality of education consumed. 
   9 
1  Introduction 
Information on the quality of various public services is becoming more and more widespread. 
Hospitals publish mortality rates, local governments are ranked according to their perceived 
customer friendliness and schools receive quality scores based on their academic achievements. 
This trend allegedly improves the overall quality of public services, as the quality information 
benefits several stakeholders. It is assumed that managers of the public services are able to 
benchmark their performance to that of their competitors, taxpayers can hold these managers 
accountable for how their money is spent and last but not least consumers may make better 
informed choices.  
So far, the empirical literature dealing with the effect of transparent quality information on 
school choice is limited. Examples outside of the education arena are Pope (2009) on hospital 
rankings and patient visits and Kling et al. (2008) on Medicare drug plan choice. Both papers 
conclude that easy-to-understand information does influence conscious choice behavior. Pope 
for example finds more non-emergency patient visits in hospitals ranked higher in a yearly 
study of the U.S. News & World Report. Concerning school choice, the indirect effects of 
quality information on housing prices due to catchment areas
1 are relatively well established 
using U.S. data (e.g. Downes and Zabel 2002; Figlio and Lucas 2004; Kane et al. 2006). There 
is less evidence on the direct effects of quality information on school choice behavior. Hastings, 
Van Weelden and Weinstein (2007) and Hastings and Weinstein (2008) are important 
contributions in this respect. Both papers study school choice of low- and middle income 
families in one particular public school district in North Carolina. The authors analyze an 
experiment in which under the No Child Left Behind act students at low-performing schools are 
given the opportunity to relocate to a different school and are provided with explicit quality 
information about the alternative schools. They find that this led to five to seven percentage 
points more parents choosing higher-scoring schools.  
This paper uses unique data from the Netherlands on publicly available school quality scores 
to assess their actual effect on school choice behavior.
2 Our paper contributes to the literature 
by investigating how secondary school choice of students from all socio-economic groups in the 
Netherlands is affected by publicly available quality information. The Netherlands presents an 
interesting setting to study the direct effect of information on school choice. It is a densely 
populated country, so that within a ten kilometer radius a child can reach on average 11 relevant 
secondary schools. Negligible school fees, good public transport, and more importantly, 
unrestricted free school choice furthermore ensure that school choice reflects preferences more 
strongly than in countries with school catchment areas and heterogeneity in school fees. 
 
1 Catchment areas provide preferential admission for inhabitant children to neighbourhood schools. 
2 In Koning and Van der Wiel (2010) we use the same dataset to analyze how school boards respond to these quality 
rankings in terms of their subsequent quality performance.   10 
Moreover, extracurricular activities take place outside of the school environment, so that these 
possibilities do not affect school choice like in other countries. 
Our data are unique on several levels. Rather than focusing on accountability programs 
initiated by the government, we assess the influence of school rankings published yearly since 
1997 by national newspaper Trouw. Knowledge of these rankings among parents of children 
about to go to high school is relatively high, also because several regional newspapers copy the 
most relevant information for their readers into their issues. Trouw uses objective quality 
indicators from the Dutch Inspectorate for Education to calculate a final, overall quality score 
for each school track offered at each school. The newspaper corrects these scores for 
differences in the initial quality of students, by adjusting them for e.g. the percentage of 
children from cultural minorities. As in principle all secondary schools in the country feature in 
the Trouw publication, we can measure the effects of the quality scores on student inflow across 
the entire quality distribution of schools. By furthermore using country-wide administrative 
student records that include specific information on students’ home addresses, the relative 
importance of quality scores versus distance from home can be investigated as well. Finally, as 
our individual level dataset also includes detailed information on household income and 
composition, we can moreover draw conclusions on differences in the responsiveness to quality 
information between socio-economic groups.  
In our paper, we draw complementary conclusions from both a longitudinal school level 
dataset and a cross-sectional individual level dataset. Using the school level dataset, we 
establish a causal effect of quality scores published by Trouw on the number of students 
entering a school in the year after publication. This effect can be interpreted as causal, as we 
control for school track fixed effects and exploit the substantial lag between the registration of 
quality indicators and their publication. It turns out that, as expected, negative school quality 
scores decrease the number of students choosing such schools, while positive quality scores 
significantly increase the inflow of students. Particularly the positive effect is strongest for 
academic school tracks which prepare for university (‘VWO’). When Trouw qualifies the 
academic track of a school as most positive, the inflow of students increases by 16 to 18 
students in the year after the publication. This is a substantial effect, given that the average 
school track cohort size is 76 students. Presumably, the smartest and most ambitious students 
pay most attention to positive quality information. This confirms earlier research in this field. 
Hastings, Kane and Staiger (2006) already showed that preference attached to schools’ mean 
test score increases with neighborhood income and the student’s own academic ability.  
The results found in the analysis of individual school choice are in line with estimates 
obtained in the school level analysis. In particular, we use an administrative dataset of all first 
year secondary school students in the Netherlands to run conditional logit regressions on each 
student’s relevant geographical choice sets. As we observe the characteristics of the chosen 
school and of the relevant alternative options within 20 km of the home address, it is possible to 
identify the effects of school quality scores. We find that the probability to choose a school is   11 
mainly driven by the traveling distance and its distance rank order, but the probability of 
attending a school is also significantly affected by its quality score in the predicted way. The 
estimates furthermore enable us to compute the implied ‘willingness to travel’ to well-
performing schools, which reveals how important quality scores are relative to the traveling 
distance. This estimated willingness to travel turns out to be rather low. Students are only 
willing to travel about 220 meters more in order to attend a well-performing rather than an 
average school. As in the school level analysis, students who attend an academic school track 
show the highest inclination to attend a well-performing school. This raises the question 
whether this difference in quality response is driven by differences in cognitive ability and 
ambition   which determine each student’s school track   or by socio-economic differences. As 
our dataset contains detailed household income and composition information, we can analyze 
this question in greater detail. In contrast to what those concerned with equity issues feared, no 
differences in quality response are found between socio-economic groups. The observed 
divergence in information response across school tracks can thus be attributed to variation in 
ability and ambition of the students attending. This suggests that at least within school tracks 
publicly available quality information does not increase inequity in the quality of education 
consumed. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the Dutch institutional environment 
and Trouw’s school quality scores in detail. Section 3 explains which school-level data and 
individual-level data is used in the empirical analysis. The empirical design is dealt with in 
Section 4, while the empirical results are presented in Section 5 of the paper. Section 6 
concludes.   12   13 
2  School choice and school quality in the Netherlands 
The Dutch Constitution guarantees freedom of education since 1848. Initially, freedom meant 
that every group of citizens was allowed to establish a school of their own religious, societal or 
educational beliefs. Since 1917 the Dutch state even finances these ‘private’ schools in the same 
way that it finances public schools that do not have a specific denomination. The Netherlands 
also has a long history in free school choice. Students can freely decide which primary, 
secondary and tertiary education outlets they wish to attend. 
It rarely happens that students are declined access to their most preferred school: (random) 
selection is only possible in the rare event that a school receives substantial over-subscription or 
when parents’ beliefs evidently deviate from those of the school. Free school choice in the 
Netherlands is often regarded as a rather unique phenomenon, because in practice there are few 
limitations to choosing a school other than the one which is located most closely (e.g. Ritzen et 
al. 1997; Bishop 1998; Dijkstra et al 2004). School fees are negligible for both public and 
private schools, so that financial constraints are not binding. Children have on average 10 
secondary schools that offer the relevant school track to choose from within a radius of 10 
kilometers of their home address. Also, sport-, musical- and other extracurricular activities 
usually do not take place at the school but elsewhere. Parents can thus focus on measures of 
school quality other than the supply of these services when choosing a school.  
In this paper, we direct our focus towards school choice behavior in secondary education 
because of the nature of this decision and for pragmatic reasons, that is, data availability. First, 
the choice which high school to attend is made deliberately and simultaneously by (the parents 
of) all 12-year old children. More specifically, children in the final year of primary education 
have to wait for their ‘school advice’ in order to enroll at a secondary school. This advice is 
compiled by their primary school teacher, who relies on the child’s test score on a centralized 
exam taken halfway through the year. Each student’s school advice states which school track 
the teacher believes he or she is able to complete. A secondary school typically requires its 
prospective students to have a school advice that coincides with the school track(s) it offers. 
Over the years the categorization of school tracks has changed, but four broad categories can be 
distinguished that were constant over time.
3 The most academically oriented school track (in 
Dutch: ‘VWO’), from which a diploma guarantees admission to universities, lasts six years. The 
middle level general school track (in Dutch: ‘HAVO’), which guarantees admission to a 
‘hogeschool’ (comparable to colleges), lasts five years. The lowest track that provides for a 
general education (in Dutch: ‘VMBO-gt’) lasts four years and prepares for vocational tertiary 
education. We limit our analysis to these three, ordinally classifiable tracks. We exclude the 
fourth track, dedicated to vocational training, as this contains such a large variety of schools 
(e.g. those focused on agriculture, on personal care or on children with special needs). Note that 
in the first and second year the vast majority of secondary schools offer multi-track classes.  
 
3 More information on the institutional environment can be found in Maas et al. (2007).   14 
Extensive data availability on both students and schools is the second reason to focus on 
secondary school choice in the Netherlands. Since 2009, Statistics Netherlands provides 
detailed administrative records for a random sample of Dutch high school students. These 
records include student home addresses (i.e. detailed postcode information) and household 
characteristics such as income and composition. In addition, a long panel dataset of schools can 
be constructed that includes publicly disclosed quality measures. This school-level dataset is 
based on school records from the Dutch Inspectorate of Education. It is augmented with 
composite school quality scores, which have been published yearly since 1997 by the national 
daily newspaper Trouw. We discuss both data sources in more detail in the next subsection. 
Each fall Trouw publishes a list of schools that are stratified by province. Although the 
newspaper does perform its own calculations, the publication is based on the school records of 
the Inspectorate of Education.
4 All four school tracks feature separately in the publication, so 
that a school that offers all tracks enters in four different locations with potentially different 
quality scores. Although the exact information presented by Trouw has changed from year to 
year, some variables were recurrent items for all years. First, this comprised background 
characteristics such as school size, religion and the percentage of children from cultural 
minorities. Second, three quality indicators are observed for all years. That is, the average grade 
students achieve at the centralized exam in their final year of education; the percentage of 
students who from third grade on leave the school with a diploma without any delay; and the 
net percentage of students who in third grade are within school tracks that are above or below 
their school advice. The registration of the last two indicators prohibits schools from ‘gaming’ 
their average grade results by either excluding low-performing students from final exams or by 
forcing students into lower school tracks. Figure A in the appendix shows an example excerpt 
of the Trouw publication in 2002.  
Trouw calculates two overall quality scores by school track on the basis of the three 
objective performance indicators.
5 First, a ‘gross’ overall quality score is determined using 
factor analysis.
6 According to this estimate all schools are then distributed into five categories 
by school track (“--”, “-”,“0”, “+” or “++”) such that a multi-track school could potentially be in 
four different categories at one and the same time. Second, in order to provide a quality measure 
that is closer to the ‘value added’ by a school, the overall raw quality score is corrected for 
several factors correlated with the initial quality of students. This has typically been done in 
OLS regressions using the percentage of children from cultural minorities as a control variable.
7 
 
4 More information on the quality information that the Inspectorate registers and on the information that Trouw publishes can 
be found in Dijkstra et al. (2001). An initial assessment of the association between the Trouw scores and student inflow was 
done by Dronkers (1999).  
5 Koning and Van der Wiel (2010) explain the estimation procedures and how they have changed over time in more detail. 
6 Although the three performance indicators mentioned have always been included in the overall scores, other variables 
such as the percentage of delayed students were also included in several other years.  
7 The percentage of children from cultural minorities has always entered the correction equation, but did change in its 
definition several times. Other controls that have been included in certain years are the percentage of students from low-
income households and the students’ school advice.   15 
In a similar fashion as for the unadjusted scores, five final quality scores are handed out, 
ranging from “--” to “++”. Parents are probably most influenced by the adjusted scores, as these 
are prominently presented by Trouw as the final quality scores. Because these adjusted scores 
are furthermore copied by several regional newspapers for the relevant schools in their area, it is 
likely that parents are directly or indirectly aware of them when deciding on which school their 
children should attend.  
There is a relatively long delay between the registration of the quality indicators by the 
Inspectorate of Education and the publication of the quality scores by Trouw. The appendix 
presents a time line in Figure B that shows the timing of the Inspectorate administration, the 
Trouw publication, and the actual school choice that is made by 12-year old children. As the 
time line shows, there is a three year lag between the registration of data and the registration of 
the potential response to that information in terms of the number of new students at a school. 
This is because the Inspectorate takes about a year and a half to generate the school quality 
records, Trouw spends another six months to finalize its publication, and students are only 
observed at a school ten months after that.  
Although the newspaper Trouw was the first media outlet to publish quality rankings of 
secondary schools, there are two other information sources parents could use. Following a 
change in policy, the Inspectorate of Education started publishing their own data on their 
website in 2000. This means that the school quality cards can be reviewed for each school and 
school track separately. The way the information is presented however   with relatively many 
details and without much clarification   makes it hard to compare quality across schools, 
especially because an overall measure of quality is absent. Next to this, the national weekly 
magazine Elsevier started publishing rankings in 2001 that are based on the same information 
from the Inspectorate that Trouw uses. A major difference between the two publications is that, 
rather than single year measures, Elsevier takes three-year moving averages of the quality 
indicators as inputs. We choose to focus on the Trouw scores in this paper, as the readership of 
Trouw is larger and as we have a longer panel for the Trouw score.   16   17 
3  Data  
3.1  School level data 
The school level dataset that we use in our analysis is compiled by joining several information 
sources. We received ‘quality cards’ for each school and school track from the Inspectorate of 
Education for the years 1995-2006. These cards provided information on the XY-coordinates of 
a school, its religious denomination, the number of students, the percentage of students in each 
school track, the percentage of students from cultural minorities and each school track’s quality 
indicators. As explained in the previous section, these objective quality indicators served as 
inputs for the overall Trouw quality scores. From Trouw we received a paper copy of each of 
their yearly school ranking publications from 1996 to 2008. As these scores were not stored 
electronically by Trouw, we manually added the final adjusted scores and the raw unadjusted 
scores to our dataset.
8 For each municipality we furthermore added information on population 
size in the relevant age categories from Statistics Netherlands.  
Our final dataset contains 7,542 yearly observations on schools recorded from 1996 to 2003 
(but published with a delay of two years) and 12,828 observations on school tracks offered at 
these schools. 46 percent of schools offer all three tracks and 39 percent of schools just offer a 
single track. Unfortunately, we cannot use data from 1995, as all information was recorded at 
the school rather than at the school track level at that time. Furthermore, in our empirical 
analysis we lose data on the three latter years as there is a three year lag between the recording 
of the objective quality measures and the recording of the number of students that could have 
responded to the publication of this quality information.  
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics of the school level dataset for the different final 
quality scores. The sample includes a substantial number of observations for which the Trouw 
score is missing, which is mostly due to the fact that the school track has too few students. 
Trouw decided not to report a final score for (very) small schools, as the confidence intervals 
for grade and diploma results at these schools are considered too large to construct overall 
scores. The high standard deviation in average grades for this subgroup highlights this 
phenomenon. Trouw divides all other school tracks into five categories of distinctly different 
sizes. About one percent of observations with a final score is filed in the very worst category (“-
-”), another one percent in the very best category (“++”), about fifty percent of observations is 
classified as performing on average (“0”) and the remaining school tracks are split between the 
badly (“-”) and well performing groups (“+”). As the classification is performed per separate 
school track, the differences in the distribution of the scores over the school tracks are 
negligible. For the school tracks that have received a final quality score, the average grades and 
the percentage of students that receive a diploma without delay increases monotonously with 
 
8 This was necessary as Trouw has used more detailed information from the Inspectorate to compute the scores than we 
had access to.    18 
the score ranking, as expected. Finally, the last two rows of Table 3.1 show that there is 
substantial variation in score ratings per school track over time. In particular, the probability to 
receive the same ranking in the next year is on average about 50 percent and almost all school 
tracks have at least once received a neutral score.  
Table 3.1  Descriptive statistics of longitudinal school dataset on school track level by Trouw score (1996-
2003) 
                       Adjusted quality score by school track 
               
    Missing  Most 
negative 
Negative  Neutral  Positive  Most 
positive 
    N.A.  --  -  0  +  ++ 
               
Observations    1,704   169  2,077  6,429  2,352  97 
               
Academic track (‘VWO’)    12%  1%  16%  50%  20%  1% 
Middle track (‘HAVO’)    15%  2%  17%  47%  18%  1% 
Lowest track (‘VMBO-gt’)    13%  1%  16%  52%  17%  1% 
               
Total number of students   Mean  664  880  1,008  1,068  1,031  785 
  St.dev.  447  400  438  483  522  785 
               
Number of first year students   Mean  49  58  73  81  81  69 
  St.dev.  38  31  39  40  41  47 
               
Grade obtained in exams  Mean  6.3  6.0  6.2  6.4  6.5  6.6 
  St.dev.  0.38  0.22  0.25  0.22  0.25  0.33 
               
Diploma without delay   Mean  71%  49%  59%  72%  77%  82% 
  St.dev.  18.1  16.6  16.5  15.5  14.5  16.9 
               
Probability to stay in category next year  0.60  0.09  0.33  0.61  0.36  0.09 
Tracks that ever receive score  50%  15%  73%  97%  79%  9% 
 
3.2  Individual level data 
For the individual choice analysis in this paper, we use a rather unique dataset on the cohort of 
students that entered the first year of secondary school in September 2003. The dataset 
combines the relevant school track information introduced in the previous subsection with 
information from two administrative datasets compiled by Statistics Netherlands. Using 
(recoded) social security numbers, we merged administrative records on the student level to 
administrative tax records on the level of the students’ households that contain detailed 
information about household income and composition. Although in principle student records for 
all students in the country are administered, we received tax record data for about one third of 
the population. This is because − for budgetary reasons − Statistics Netherlands randomly 
selects only one third of observations from the tax authority’s database.    19 
For all first year students, we have constructed the relevant choice set of schools in their 
neighborhood. It is assumed that students limit their school searching behavior to one school 
track only, such that the school track that a student is observed in defines the choice set. For 
26% of the children in our sample, we know this school track right away as they attend single 
track schools or are admitted to single track classes. We use administrative records from the 
academic year 2005/2006 to retrieve the school track of the students for which it could not be 
recovered directly, as in the third year of secondary school the vast majority of mixed-track 
classes have transitioned to single track ones. For about thirty percent of the students we 
however fail to retrieve the school track through this procedure, as their schools do not 
administer which school track their students are in before the final year. These students are 
therefore left out of the analysis. All in all, we have a sample of 23,923 first year students of 
which we know household income that chose to attend a school less than 20 km from home. Of 
these observations 7,430 students attend the most academic track, 7,176 students attend the 
middle general track and 9,317 students attend the lowest general track. On average, students 
have 29 school track options within 20 km of their home, resulting in 670,272 observed 
combinations of individuals and school tracks.  
Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics of the individual level data. Consistent with the 
national statistics produced by Statistics Netherlands, the percentage of female students is 
largest in the most academic track and lowest in the lowest track. The percentage of children 
from ethnic minorities decreases in the school track level. Out of the three tracks, the most 
academic one hosts most children from entrepreneurial families, whereas the least academic one 
hosts most children from households that receive government benefits. Measured in terms of 
household income quartiles, the distribution over the three school tracks is also consistent with 
official statistics. In particular, 43% of children attending the academic track are from 
households in the top income quartile, whereas this is only the case for 22% of children in the 
lowest general track. The average distance that children have to travel to get to their nearest 
school is between 2.3 and 2.9 kilometers, while the average distance to the school actually 
chosen ranges between 3.9 and 4.3 kilometers. This traveling distance is largest for the students 
that attend the most academic track and smallest for those attending the lowest general track. 
About 40% of children choose the secondary school that is closest to their home address, such 
that the majority of children choose to travel beyond.    20 
Table 3.2         Descriptive statistics of individual students dataset by school track attended 






       
Number of administrative records   25,764    24,640    31,978  
       
Records with household income observed   8,549    8,389    10,991  
Records with income and school choice observed   8,107    7,823    9,811  
Full records, choice within 20km observed  7,430  7,176  9,317 
       
Final choice set of individuals and schools  194,834    184,655  290,783  
         
Girls    53.3%  52.1%  50.6% 
Dutch ethnicity    84.6%  83.6%  79.9% 
         
Main income source: wages     73.4%  74.4%  72.0% 
Main income source: own business    22.3%  20.0%  19.2% 
Main income source: government benefits    3.0%  4.2%  7.3% 
         
Household income below 25th percentile    14.8%  18.5%  23.9% 
Household income above 75th percentile    42.0%  30.4%  21.8% 
         
Number of schools in choice set within 20km  Mean  29  27  37 
  St.dev.  20  19  24 
         
Number of schools in choice set within 10km  Mean  11  9  12 
  St.dev.  8  8  10 
         
Minimum distance to a school  Mean  2.7  2.9  2.3 
  St.dev.  3.1  3.4  2.6 
         
Distance to school that is chosen  Mean  4.3  4.2  3.9 
  St.dev.  3.8  3.7  3.6 
         
Students choosing closest school    36.4%  41.9%  40.1%   21 
4  Empirical analysis 
4.1  School level data analysis 
This subsection explains how we identify a causal effect of school quality scores on school 
choice in the year after Trouw’s publication. The dependent variable in this school level 
analysis is (a proxy for) the number of first year students at a particular school. We argue that 
this effect is causal, as we control for school (track) fixed effects and as the relevant quality 
scores are computed using lagged information. Estimating fixed effects is important because 
time constant omitted variables of school characteristics are likely to be positively correlated 
with both the number of students entering a school and the quality score the school receives. 
For instance, the reputation of a school based on its approach to teaching could be such a time-
constant omitted variable. The better this reputation, the higher the number of students 
attending the school, but also the better the quality scores. Not controlling for such unobserved 
characteristics would yield estimates for the effect of quality scores on student numbers that are 
likely to be overestimated.
9  
Besides time-invariant omitted variables, time-varying omitted variables could also be 
positively correlated with the Trouw quality rankings. For example, we do not observe the 
composition of the school board that may well change over time. If parents are persuaded to 
choose a school because of a new management team and this team also influences the relevant 
quality scores positively, the quality score response would again be overestimated. In our 
analysis we avoid such endogeneity problems by exploiting the three-year lag between the 
registration of quality information and the potential response to the information. As we have 
argued earlier, this lag consists of a two-year delay between the registration and publication of 
quality information and a delay of an additional year between the publication of Trouw and the 
observed school choice. The long lag breaks down any instantaneous correlation between 
omitted variables at time t that influence both student inflow at time t and the quality score 
published at time t-1.  
We estimate fixed effect regressions on two levels of data: school track fixed effect 
regressions of the number of first year students in each track and school fixed effect regressions 
on the total number of first year students at a school. The advantage of these two levels is that 
their results enable us to address spillover effects of the quality scores on the inflow into other 
school tracks within the same school. That is, school tracks may benefit from good scores that 
other school tracks have received. The school track fixed effect regressions measure the effect 
of the school track quality scores on student numbers as directly as possible. We do however 
not directly observe the number of first year students in each school track, as many schools only 
offer mixed-track first year classes. Therefore we proxy the number of first year students within 
 
9 Column (II) in Table 5.6 shows the OLS estimates that correspond to those in our baseline fixed effect regression in 
column (I) in Table 5.1. Indeed, the OLS estimates are typically much larger than those estimates using fixed effects.    22 
a track in academic year t by the number of third year students in each track in period t+2. Per 
school track, we thus lose two yearly observations. The number of first year students is 
moreover observed with a measurement error, as in two years time the school track cohort will 
have lost and/or added some students. We will assume that this measurement error is random, 
so independent of the other variables in the regression. This means the measurement error only 
affects the efficiency, and not the consistency, of our estimates. Besides the school track 
regressions, we estimate school level fixed effect regressions of the total number of new first 
year students at each school. The dependent variables in those regressions are (among others) 
the quality scores that each school track within that school has received. Although the estimated 
effects are less straightforward to interpret, this procedure gains two years of information and 
leaves room for spillover effects between one school track’s score and the inflow into other 
tracks. We will explain both procedures in more detail below. 
The above arguments on endogeneity and the unit of analysis are formalized by specifying 
equation (1). The number of first year students y for schools i, school tracks j and time periods t 
serves as our dependent variable: 
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In the equation, all Rr’s are dummies representing the occurrence of quality scores r per school 
track j. The dummy “NA” equals one if no quality score is provided for school track j at school 
i. The x variables represent time varying controls from this period or the period in which the 
quality information was recorded. The x-variables include market size proxies like the size of 
the adolescent population in the municipality and the number of schools in the municipality at 
time t, but also school characteristics at time t-3 such as the total number of students that 
attended the school
10, the number of branches the school management operated, the percentage 
of students in each school track and the percentage of children from cultural minorities.
11 We 
also include all (yearly) time dummies T. As we are estimating school track fixed effects, there 
are two separate error terms: the time-invariant school track specific term υij and the error term 
εijt, which we assume to be i.i.d. (0, σε
2). In the school track regressions we furthermore correct 
our standard errors for clustering at the school level. 
It is possible to aggregate equation (1) over all school tracks to the level of schools, resulting 
in equation (2). The total number of new first year students y for schools i and time periods t is 
the dependent variable in this equation: 
 
 
10 One could worry about the fact that students at t-3 are a function of lagged dependent variables, causing our within 
estimator to be inconsistent. We have estimated models with and without the number of students at t-3 as an independent 
variable and the quality score estimates are somewhat stronger when we leave the number of students out.  
11 It should be noted that the definition of cumi-students has changed in 2003 and in 2005. The average value of this 
variable is therefore not presented in Table 3.1. In the estimation of our models, we also control for this variable by allowing 
its impact to vary from year to year.   23 
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The quality scores Rrij,t-3 and the dummy for an unknown score enter for each school track j 
separately. The x and T variables represent the same controls as in (1). As equation (2) follows 
from adding up equation (1) over the school tracks, we can check for spillover effects of school 
track scores on the inflow at other school tracks within the same school. In particular, if there 
are no spillover effects of the quality score of school track j on the inflow of students in school 
track l, for l j ≠ , we would estimate α β = and χ δ = .  The error term in equation (2) 
consists of two components: the time-invariant school specific term υi and the i.i.d. error term 
ηit. As a result of the summation over school tracks, the two error components both consist of 
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As we use a within group estimator, the υi drops out of the estimation, implying that its 
composition is of no consequence. The matter is a bit more complicated for the composition of 
ηit. There would be no problem if the covariance between εijt and εilt is equal to zero for l j ≠ . 
As it is however likely that the covariance of the error terms within each school is positive, the 
random error term could have a larger variance. Although the efficiency of estimates diminishes 
because of this, it will not render them inconsistent. 
In the empirical results section of this paper, one additional specification and two robustness 
checks of the school-level analysis are presented. We examine the causal effect of quality 
scores on the percentage of new first year students in a school-track fixed effect regression 
using the logarithm of yijt. The robustness checks estimate school track regressions with two 
additional regressors: Trouw’s unadjusted quality scores based on data from t-3 and Trouw’s 
final quality scores based on data from t-2. The rationale for these checks is explained more 
thoroughly in the next subsection. 
4.2  Individual level data analysis 
In this subsection, we consider the role that publicly available information plays in the school 
choice process of students and parents in more detail. In particular, the individual level analysis 
addresses two issues that cannot be touched upon with the school- and school track-level 
estimation results. First, special interest lies in the relative importance of quality scores versus 
distance from home. Second, the individual data allow us to estimate potential differences in the 
responses of socio-economic groups to quality scores. For this purpose, we estimate conditional 
logit regressions on the set of schools that children could have chosen. We define this set to   24 
consist of all schools that offer the school track relevant to the student that lie within 20km of 
the child’s home address.
12 As we have data on a random sample of all children in the 
Netherlands, there is considerable variation in the choice sets future secondary school students 
face.  
The starting point for the conditional logit analysis is the assumption that students and their 
parents choose the school that maximizes their utility. The utility that each school generates for 
a student is in part determined by characteristics of the school and in part by a random error 
component that differs by student and school. In certain specifications, interaction terms of the 
school characteristics with individual characteristics will also contribute to the utility function. 
Note that the conditional logit model assumes equal preferences for all students with identical 
characteristics. We prefer this easy-to-interpret method above random preference models, 
because we lack longitudinal data per child on its school choice. This is a common problem 
when investigating school choice, as most children only choose a secondary school once in their 
life.  
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in which each Rci represents a dummy for the quality score given to each school that child c 
considers. The dummy “NA” equals one if no quality score is provided for the relevant school 
track at school i in the choice set of student c. The key control variable is the distance from 
home to each school, dci. The set of x variables also includes seven dummies for different 
categories of the relative distance rank order of the school and several school characteristics 
recorded at time t-3 such as the total number of students that attended the school, the total 
number of first year students, the number of branches the school management operated, the 
percentage of students in each school track and the percentage of children from cultural 
minorities. It is important to control for school size as it is likely that students are more familiar 
with large schools through informal networks and more extensive marketing. The probability of 
choosing such a school will thus also be larger. We use standard maximum likelihood to 
estimate the parameters in the model.  
The estimates for the coefficients of the quality score dummies (β) and the coefficient of the 
distance variable (κ) are useful in order to determine the implied ‘willingness to travel’ to a 
school of a certain quality.
13 The willingness to travel to a school of a quality r rather than to a 
similar school of quality s, wherer s ≠ , is given by equation (4). 
 
12 This range is altered as a robustness check in the next section. 
13 It should be noted here that, as a result of including the distance rank order dummies, the willingness to travel coefficients 
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This expression measures the relative importance of the quality score versus the importance of 
distance. The higher the willingness to travel to a well-performing school, the more important is 
the role quality information plays in the school choice process. The delta method is used to 
estimate the pertaining standard errors. 
In certain specifications of equation (3), the x-variables also include interactions of the 
quality score and distance variables with certain individual characteristics. These interaction 
terms enable us to examine potential differences in the responsiveness of certain groups to 
different school characteristics. In the empirical section, we choose to focus on interactions with 
household income groups, dummies for the most important income component and the ethnicity 
of the child.  
Identification issues and robustness checks 
When estimating the β’s in the individual school choice analysis, there are two potential sources 
of endogeneity. First, the choice set of students can be endogenous if parents are free to choose 
where to locate their families. Second, like in the school level analysis, school quality scores 
can be correlated with omitted variables such as the reputation of a school.  
To start with, the endogenous location decision could lead to an overestimation of the effect 
of distance on school choice and to an underestimation of the effect of the quality scores. This 
would stem from the fact that parents choose to live close to schools with high quality rankings. 
Although we have to keep in mind that our estimates are conditional on the location decision of 
parents, the endogeneity of location is largely irrelevant in the Dutch context. First, the high 
density of secondary schools in our sample (on average 31 schools within 20km and 11 schools 
within 10km of the home address) generates diverse choice sets. This means that the proximity 
to a school with a positive quality score is often compensated by the proximity of a school with 
a negative quality score. As long as there is sufficient quality diversity, we are able to estimate 
the relative effect of quality scores in our conditional logit regressions. Second, it is not likely 
that the Trouw quality assessment is an important driver of moving behavior of parents. 
Mobility in the Netherlands is generally low because of rental restrictions, property transfer 
taxes and cultural preferences for specific areas. Each year only 4 percent of individuals move 
from one municipality to another (Source: Statistics Netherlands, 2009). Using the 
administrative student records, we also observe that the percentage of children that moves is 
constant over the ages seven to fifteen. If parents base their location decision on Trouw, we 
would expect a higher probability of moving at ages eleven and twelve. Moreover, it should be 
stressed that the variability in Trouw quality scores for a given school track at a given school is 
high from one year to the next. In particular, in our sample the probability that a school track 
receives a different score next year is 0.47. Given this large variance it is unlikely that 
households are willing to pay high transfer costs in order to live close to a school with a high   26 
Trouw score. Thus, all in al we argue that endogeneity problems due to location decisions will 
be limited in our specific analysis, 
Endogeneity concerns can also arise in the individual level analysis because we do not 
control for time-invariant variables that are correlated with the adjusted Trouw quality scores 
and with school choice. Typically, school choice is largely driven by the reputation of a school, 
which we do not observe. Given that each child chooses a secondary school only once, we 
cannot resort to a fixed effect approach to solve this problem, as we did in the previous 
subsection. However, we can perform robustness checks by estimating the effects on school 
choice of variables that are expected to proxy the reputation of schools. If adding such controls 
does not alter the coefficient estimates for the final Trouw scores, this would suggest that the 
publication of these quality scores has a true effect on school choice. We propose both the 
unadjusted Trouw score and the adjusted Trouw score based on school performance two years 
rather than three years ago as appropriate variables for such robustness checks.  
As explained in Section 3, per school track newspaper Trouw publishes both an overall 
quality score which is unadjusted for student composition, and a final adjusted score. The 
adjusted score partially corrects for the initial quality of the students entering the school and is 
presented much more prominently in the publication. It is however likely that the correlation 
between the unadjusted score and factors such as reputation is higher than that between the 
Trouw final score and reputation. Prejudice towards schools with many immigrant children 
might play a role, but also prejudice towards schools that are typically chosen by children from 
higher socio-economic groups. In a conditional logit regression of school choice on both the 
final scores and the unadjusted scores, we can thus check how the two estimates compare. If the 
estimated coefficients for the unadjusted scores are smaller and less significant, we may 
conclude that overestimation because of confounding factors is not a particularly large problem.  
The other indicator that we include as a robustness check is the Trouw score that is 
published right after students have chosen their secondary school. We argued in the previous 
section that there is a three year lag between the registration of quality data and the observed 
response by students. A few months after the students first enter their new school, Trouw 
publishes a new quality ranking, based on two-year old information. It is likely that omitted 
variables show a stronger correlation with this two-year old information than with the three-
year old information. We can check whether the inclusion of the more recent quality scores 
diminishes the estimates for the three year lagged scores. If not, we are confident that the actual 
publication of quality information in Trouw matters for school choice.    27 
5  Empirical results 
5.1  School level data results 
In this subsection, we establish a causal effect of publicly available quality information on the 
number of students choosing a school in the Netherlands. The results of the school level 
analysis are shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Baseline estimates according to school-track level 
equation (1) are presented in the first four columns of Table 5.1. Column I presents estimates 
for all school tracks together, whereas the other three columns focus on one of the three 
particular school tracks. Baseline estimates according to school-level equation (2) are presented 
in the last column of Table 5.1, with the quality scores for different school tracks entering 
separately. Table 5.2 presents robustness checks of the school-track level results.  
The five columns in Table 5.1 present regression coefficients for Trouw’s final quality 
scores. The first column shows that there is indeed a significant, albeit small, effect of the 
quality scores on the number of students that enroll at that particular track. The school track 
cohort of new first year students is estimated to be two students smaller when a track scores a 
minus (“-”) compared to a track that receives a neutral score. We find the cohort of new 
students to grow by one student when a school track scores a plus (“+”). These are small 
effects, compared to the average number of 76 first year students attending a school track. The 
largest effect is found when Trouw qualifies a school track as excellent (“++”), with eight more 
students attending the particular school track in the year after Trouw’s publication. When 
evaluating the estimates for the separate school tracks, the quality information response is 
largest for the most academic school tracks (column II). We estimate that sixteen more students 
choose a school in the most academic track in the year after Trouw has given it a “++”.
14 No 
significant effects are obtained for the middle academic track, while two small, yet significant 
coefficients are obtained for the lowest general track.  
 
14 A larger effect is found when focusing on schools that only offer the most academic track. The response in terms of 
student numbers is minus twelve when such a school scores a minus, and plus 28 when such a school scores a double 
plus.    28 
Table 5.1    Regression coefficients from school (track) fixed effect regressions in school level analysis 
  (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V) 
Dependent variable  First year students in 
school track 
First year students in 
school track 
First year students in 
school track 
First year students in 
school track 
First year students in 
school 
           




Lowest general track 
(VMBO) 
All schools 
Final quality score published before t 
Not available  − 0.779  (0.80)         
Most negative  − 2.279   (1.49)         
Negative  − 1.885***  (0.51)         
Neutral  Reference         
Positive  1.207*  (0.53)         
Most positive  7.729*  (3.04)         
 
Final quality score published before t ─ school track VWO 
Not available    0.178  (1.64)      9.432**  (3.24) 
Most negative    − 2.667  (3.40)      − 1.144  (6.01) 
Negative    − 2.667**  (0.97)      − 3.866*  (1.86) 
Neutral    Reference        Reference 
Positive    1.610  (0.86)      3.196  (1.71) 
Most positive    16.356**  (6.18)      17.949*  (8.29) 
 
Final quality score published before t ─ school track HAVO 
Not available      − 1.382  (1.47)    − 7.781*  (3.12) 
Most negative      − 3.425  (2.59)    − 10.659*  (5.19) 
Negative      − 1.586  (0.93)    − 5.664**  (1.90) 
Neutral         Reference     Reference 
Positive      − 0.078  (1.10)    0.603  (1.86) 
Most positive      8.772  (6.25)    10.983  (6.58) 
           
Final quality score published before t − school track VMBO-gt 
Not available        − 1.052  (1.13)  − 2.432  (1.82) 
Most negative        − 0.952  (2.01)  8.026  (4.76) 
Negative        − 1.613*  (0.81)  − 0.775  (1.61) 
Neutral          Reference     Reference 
Positive        1.858*  (0.78)  2.122  (1.55) 
Most positive        1.697  (2.41)  7.231  (6.22) 
           
Observations  9,064  2,702  2,768  3,594  7,542 
R2 overall  0.052  0.112  0.048  0.029  − 0.139 
           
- Additional controls include: the size of the adolescent population in the municipality at t, the number of schools in the municipality at t, the total number 
of students that attended the school at t-3, the number of branches the school management operated at t-3, the percentage of students in each school 
track at t-3, the percentage of children from cultural minorities at t-3 and all time dummies. 
- Standard errors between parentheses. 
- * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Column V in Table 5.1 presents the coefficient estimates for school fixed effects regressions of 
the total number of new first year students at each school, instead of using school track fixed 
effects.
15 Recall from the previous section that these results help us in detecting potential 
spillover effects of school track quality scores on the inflow of students into other school tracks. 
When comparing the academic school track results from Column II to the academic track 
coefficients in Column V, the coefficient estimates appear very similar, although somewhat 
smaller. As explained in Section 4.1, the measurement error in the school track dependent 
variable may lead to underestimation of the quality information effects. The similarity between 
the estimates in Column II and Column V suggests that there are little spillover effects between 
the quality scores of the most academic school track and student inflow into other school tracks. 
We do find spillover effects for the middle academic school track however, as there are 
significant differences between the estimates in Column III and those in Column V. Although 
the direct effects of the HAVO quality scores on new student numbers are limited, the inflow of 
students into other school tracks seems negatively affected by negative quality scores for this 
school track. We estimate that eleven students less choose to attend a school after its HAVO 
department has received a “--”, while six students less choose a school after the middle 
academic track was awarded a single “-”. There are no significant effects on the school level for 
the quality scores of the lowest level school track. This confirms our earlier finding that 
information responses are confined to the most academic track.  
Robustness checks 
Table 5.2 presents additional school track level regressions in order to establish the robustness 
of the effect of quality information on collective school choice. Column VI presents coefficients 
estimated in school track fixed effects regressions of the log of new first year student numbers. 
This column hence shows the student number effects of the quality scores, which are 
proportional to the average size of the new cohort. When a track scores a “-”, three percent less 
students attend the track in the year after, while two percent more student attend the track after 
it has received a “+”. The largest relative effect is found when a school track is rated as 
excellent (“++”): the group of new first year students then grows by eleven percent.  
Columns VII and VIII present coefficients from school track fixed effects regressions with 
additional quality variables that theoretically have a larger correlation with unobserved factors 
such as the reputation of a certain school track. The estimates in Column VII include those for 
the unadjusted quality scores that Trouw publishes, next to the final scores that we have focused 
on so far. As explained in Section 2, the final scores correct for the initial quality of inflow to 
some extent, while the unadjusted scores do not. Column VII shows that the response to the 
unadjusted scores is insignificant and much smaller than to the final scores.  
 
15 Note that the estimates of the dummies stating that the quality score is ‘Not available’ combine the effects of a quality 
score not being available for a certain school track and the school track not being available at all. This renders these 
estimates less comparable across rows.    30 
Table 5.2   Robustness checks on school level analysis with school (track) fixed effect regressions  
  (VI)  (VII)  (VIII) 
Dependent variable  Log first year students 
in school track 
First year students in 
school track 
First year students in 
school track 
       
Selection  All school tracks  All school tracks  All school tracks 
 
Final quality score published before t 
Not available  − 0.013  − 0.352  − 1.099 
  (0.02)  (0.97)  (0.83) 
Most negative  − 0.042  − 2.075  − 1.923 
  (0.03)  (1.48)  (1.54) 
Negative  − 0.027***  − 1.691**  − 1.914*** 
  (0.01)  (0.55)  (0.52) 
Neutral  Reference  Reference  Reference 
Positive  0.018*  1.100  1.371* 
  (0.01)  (0.57)  (0.55) 
Most positive  0.106**  7.451*  7.299* 
  (0.04)  (2.97)  (3.05) 
Unadjusted  quality score published before t 
Not available    − 1.200   
    (1.23)   
Most negative    − 1.207   
    (2.03)   
Negative    − 0.920   
    (0.92)   
Neutral    Reference   
Positive    − 0.354   
    (0.71)   
Most positive    0.908   
    (1.35)   
Final quality score published after t 
Not available      − 2.669*** 
      (0.81) 
Most negative      2.207 
      (1.57) 
Negative      − 1.100 
      (0.56) 
Neutral      Reference 
Positive      1.513* 
      (0.61) 
Most positive      − 1.083 
      (1.94) 
       
Observations  9,064  9,064  9,064 
R2 overall  0.038  0.052  0.056 
 
- Additional controls include: the size of the adolescent population in the municipality at t, the number of schools in the municipality at t, the total 
number of students that attended the school at t-3, the number of branches the school management operated at t-3, the percentage of students in 
each school track at t-3, the percentage of children from cultural minorities at t-3 and all time dummies. 
- Standard errors between parentheses and * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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The second robustness check in Column VIII yields estimates of a school track regression that 
includes both the final Trouw scores published in the year before students pick a school, as well 
as those published right after students have already chosen their school. Although there cannot 
be a direct effect of the later publication on school choice, it is likely that the correlation 
between the data underlying the Trouw scores in t+1 (gathered at t-2) and unobserved factors 
determining school choice at time t is substantial. However, the relevant Trouw score estimates 
in Column VIII are almost identical to those in the original specification (i.e. Column I), 
whereas the estimates of the scores published at t+1 are smaller and less significant. These 
robustness checks thus again confirm the general finding that parents pay attention to the 
newspaper quality scores when choosing a school for their child.  
5.2  Individual level data results 
This subsection analyzes the quality information effects on individual school choice in more 
detail. By assessing individual school choice behavior, we can provide more insight into the 
relative importance of Trouw’s quality scores and into differences in quality responses between 
socio-economic groups. Table 5.3 contains estimated odds ratios obtained from conditional 
logit regressions of school choice on the characteristics of all schools that offer the relevant 
school track within 20 kilometers of each child’s home address. This table shows how the 
probability of choosing a school track is affected by the distance parameters and the quality 
scores. Table 5.4 uses the coefficient estimates in the same regressions to present the implied 
‘willingness to travel’ to schools with certain quality scores. This table gives an idea of the 
importance of quality scores vis-à-vis other school characteristics such as distance. Note that 
Table A in the appendix presents coefficient estimates of extended conditional logit regressions 
that include interactions of both distance and school quality with various socio-economic 
characteristics of students. In these extended models, any differences in the quality score 
response between socio-economic groups should show up in the interaction term estimates. 
Table 5.5 finally presents sensitivity checks on the conditional logit regressions from Table 5.3.  
The odds ratios that are shown in Table 5.3 are for the full sample (Column I), for the most 
academic school track only (Column II), for the middle academic school track only (Column 
III) and for the lowest general school track only (Column IV). In all four regressions, the 
distance to a school in kilometers and the distance rank order of a school are the most important 
determinants of school choice. These two factors explain between 89 (for academic track 
students) and 98 percent (lower track students) of the 46 percent of choice behavior that is 
explained by observed characteristics. The first row in Table 5.3 starts out with the average 
unconditional probability of a school being chosen in each of the regressions. These base 
probabilities − ranging from 3 to 4% − are useful to interpret the size of the odds ratios below. 
In the first column the probability of a school being chosen goes down by 31 percent for each 
kilometer it is located further away from the child’s home address. Our preferred specification   32 
of the distance variable is linear, as quadratic and non-linear specifications did not add much 
explanatory power and the interpretation of willingness to travel coefficients is more 
straightforward. The distance rank order of a school is included in our regressions to control for 
the difference in school density between students’ choice sets. In all columns, the odds ratios of 
the distance rank order of a school consistently decrease from the closest school until the school 
that is further away than 14 others (15th rank order). For the entire sample, the probability of 
choosing a school that is the 2nd or 3rd closest to home is 15 percent smaller than choosing the 
closest school, ceteris paribus.  
The school quality indicators do seem to matter for individual school choice, particularly 
when analyzing all school tracks together. According to our estimates, a school that has been 
ranked most negatively (“--”) is 27 percent less likely to be chosen compared to an identical 
school that receives a neutral quality score, whereas a school that has been ranked moderately 
negatively (“-”) is 12 percent less likely to be chosen. Good quality scores increase the 
likelihood a school track is chosen, with schools scoring well (“+”) being 9 percent more likely 
to be chosen. We do not find a significant effect for the most positive quality score (“++”), 
although an odds ratio larger than one is consistent with more students attending a school. 
When looking at the different school track samples separately, a positive quality score only 
generates an odds ratio significantly different from one for the most academic school track. This 
confirms our findings for the school level analysis. Column II shows that students are 13 
percent more likely to pick an academic school track that scores a “+”, compared to an identical 
academic school track with a neutral score. Column III shows that the probability of choosing a 
school of the middle academic track that is graded most negatively (“--”) is small. For school 
choice in the lowest general track, it matters whether the school received a negative quality 
score. The estimated probability of choosing a VMBO school that received the most negative 
ranking is 28 percent lower than the probability of choosing a neutral scoring school and the 
probability of choosing a school that received a single “-” is 15 percent lower. 
In Table 5.3 we furthermore show the odds ratio of the percentage of children from cultural 
minorities. Each additional percent of children from cultural minorities in the school track 
decreases the probability of choosing the school by one to two percent. In more detailed 
regressions we however found a strong opposite result for children that are not of Dutch origin 
who actually prefer going to schools with many students from cultural minorities. This effect is 
substantial as the average school has six percent of students from cultural minorities (ranging 
from four percent in the academic track and seven percent in the lowest track). Note that the 
standard errors for this variable are small, so that this is a very robust finding.    33 
Table 5.3 Odds ratios from conditional logit regressions in individual level analysis 
  (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Dependent variable  School choice within 
20 km 
School choice within 
20 km 
School choice within 
20 km 
School choice within 
20 km 
         
Selection  All first year students  Students in most 
academic track 
Students in middle 
academic track 
Students in lowest 
general track 
         
Average unconditional probability of choosing a school
 
  0.035  0.038  0.039  0.032 
 
Distance from home address to school in kilometers 
  0.685***  0.678***  0.666***  0.696*** 
  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.008) 
 
Rank order distance from home address to school 
1
st  Reference  Reference  Reference  Reference 
2
nd to 3
rd  0.846***  0.833***  0.811***  0.875*** 
  (0.019)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.030) 
4
th to 6
th  0.634***  0.629***  0.628***  0.632*** 
  (0.029)  (0.052)  (0.055)  (0.046) 
7
th to 10
th  0.463***  0.480***  0.484***  0.444*** 
  (0.042)  (0.074)  (0.082)  (0.065) 
11
th to 15
th  0.382***  0.383***  0.481***  0.342*** 
  (0.058)  (0.105)  (0.110)  (0.091) 
16
th to 21
st  0.393***  0.443***  0.457***  0.351*** 
  (0.074)  (0.135)  (0.145)  (0.114) 
22
nd and beyond  0.472***  0.551***  0.692*  0.370*** 
  (0.084)  (0.156)  (0.160)  (0.127) 
 
Final quality score published before t 
Not available  0.700***  0.998  1.125  0.651*** 
  (0.032)  (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.052) 
Most negative  0.727**  N.A.
#  0.586*  0.719* 
  (0.123)    (0.217)  (0.154) 
Negative  0.880***  0.995  0.934  0.854*** 
  (0.025)  (0.047)  (0.044)  (0.039) 
Neutral  Reference  Reference  Reference  Reference 
Positive  1.088***  1.130**  1.057  1.049 
  (0.022)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.038) 
Most positive  1.082  0.940  1.186  0.937 
  (0.082)  (0.108)  (0.360)  (0.145) 
 
Percentage of children from cultural minorities 
  0.984***  0.993*  0.990***  0.987*** 
  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
         
Observations  670,272  194,834  184,655  290,783 
R2  0.46  0.46  0.47  0.46 
 
- 
# In 2003, no VWO-schools were classified as performing in this category. 
- Additional controls include: the total number of students that attended the school at t-3, the total number of first year students at t-3, the 
number of branches the school management operated at t-3 and the percentage of students in each school track at t-3. 
- Standard errors of coefficients in parentheses and * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Table 5.4 presents the implied ‘willingness to travel’ (WTT) towards schools with certain 
quality scores that is inferred from coefficient estimates of the conditional logit regressions. 
These willingness to travel estimates indicate how important other school characteristics are, 
compared to the traveling distance. Note that each WTT should be interpreted ceteris paribus, 
so that it is also conditional on the rank order category of a school. The estimates in Table 5.4 
represent the willingness to travel to an average school, so that there is a positive WTT for 
negative quality scores and a negative WTT for positive quality scores. The table highlights that 
given that the average distance to the chosen school is about four kilometers in our sample, the 
traveling distance outweighs school quality scores in the individual school decision. The largest 
(significant) distance students are willing to travel (in Column I) is 844 meters, so as to avoid a 
school that is considered of the most negative quality. The smallest estimated distance that 
students are willing to travel is 222 meters, so as to attend a school that is considered of a 
positive quality.
16 
Table 5.4     Implied willingness to travel to schools with certain quality scores, ceteris paribus 
  (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Dependent variable  School choice 
within 20 km 
School choice 
within 20 km 
School choice 
within 20 km 
School choice 
within 20 km 
         
Selection  All first year 
students 
Students in most 
academic track  
(VWO) 
Students in middle 
academic track 
(HAVO) 
Students in lowest 
general track 
(VMBO) 
         
Willingness to travel in km to attend a school with a neutral quality score rather than a: 
Most negative quality score  0.844*  N.A.  1.312  0.909 
  (0.323)    (0.534)  (0.425) 
Negative quality score  0.339**  0.013  0.167*  0.435** 
  (0.119)  (0.121)  (0.128)  (0.182) 
Positive quality score  − 0.222***  − 0.314**  − 0.135*  − 0.132 
  (0.058)  (0.098)  (0.104)  (0.136) 
Most positive quality score  − 0.209  − 0.160  − 0.420  − 0.179 
  (0.218)  (0.276)  (0.885)  (0.399) 
         
- Standard errors of willingness to travel in parentheses, obtained though delta method. 
- * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
So far, one of our key findings is that the quality responses in school choice are mostly confined 
to the higher, more academic education tracks. This raises the question whether this is driven by 
differences in cognitive ability of (parents and) students ─ which determine each student’s 
school track ─ or by differences in the socio-economic situation of households. In other papers 
 
16 In order to assess the value of this number, we compare it to another school track characteristic that students and parents 
care about: the percentage of children from cultural minorities. It is estimated that students are also willing to travel 222 
meters to attend a school with only 0.3% immigrant children, rather than a school with the average percentage of 5.6%.   35 
on quality information and school choice (e.g. Hastings, Kane and Staiger, 2006) it is implied 
that higher socio-economic groups pay better attention to school quality information than other 
groups, thereby possibly enlarging inequities in the quality of education enjoyed. In order to 
check for the existence of differential quality responses in our sample, we therefore re-estimate 
the baseline conditional logit regressions with interactions terms of individual characteristics. 
These terms include all linear combinations of the three household characteristics income 
group, ethnicity and main income source with the distance variable and the quality scores. The 
estimated coefficients of the household interaction terms with a negative quality score (“-”) and 
with a positive quality score (“+”) can be found in Table A in the appendix. Only two out of 
forty interaction coefficients are significantly different from zero. In contrast to the findings of 
Hastings et al. (2006), virtually no differences can thus be found in how important quality 
scores are for school choice of different socio-economic groups. Only in the regression for 
students in the lowest general track (Column VIII) income has the predicted impact. That is, 
children from higher income households in this track are more likely to choose a well-
performing school. We conclude that the way in which quality scores influence school choice 
thus differs by school track attended, which is driven by the student’s ability and ambition, but 
not by the characteristics of the student’s household.  
Robustness checks 
Table 5.5 below presents three robustness checks for the individual level analysis which we 
discussed in Section 4.2. Column IX shows odds ratios for a conditional logit regression of 
school choice on the characteristics of all relevant schools within 10, rather than 20 kilometers 
of each child’s home address. The column was included to analyze the sensitivity of our school 
choice results to the chosen distance range. A smaller range apparently strengthens the 
estimated effects of the quality scores as the odds ratios are larger (smaller) and more 
significant than those in Column I.  
The estimates shown in columns X and XI are comparable to the robustness checks in the 
school level analysis (Columns VII and VIII in Table 5.2) in that they test for the additional 
effects of the unadjusted quality scores and of the final quality scores published at a later time. 
These variables are included to test whether the results found so far are troubled by 
confounding factors. As the association between unobserved factors such as the reputation of a 
school track and the unadjusted score is likely to be higher than for the adjusted score, the 
unadjusted score could potentially absorb the effects found for the final score. The results in 
Column X however show that this is generally not the case. The odds ratios for the final score 
are similar to those found in Column I and the odds ratios for the unadjusted score are 
insignificant, with the exception of the most positive score. Column XI finally demonstrates 
that the results for Trouw’s final quality scores are robust to the inclusion of more recent 
information, that is, the quality score published at t+1. All in all, we conclude that also in   36 
individual choice behaviour the publicly available quality information plays a significant, albeit 
small, role.   
Table 5.5    Robustness checks on estimated odds ratios from conditional logit regressions in individual level 
                    analysis              
  (IX)  (X)  (XI) 
Dependent variable  School choice within 10 km  School choice within 20 km  School choice within 20 km 
       
Selection  Students in all school tracks  Students in all school tracks  Students in all school tracks 
 
Final quality score published before t 
Not available  0.687***  0.725  0.773*** 
  (0.035)  (0.227)  (0.036) 
Most negative  0.666**  0.685**  0.766* 
  (0.131)  (0.130)  (0.125) 
Negative  0.885***  0.880***  0.883*** 
  (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.025) 
Positive  1.115***  1.058*  1.071** 
  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.023) 
Most positive  1.088  1.007  1.079 
  (0.087)  (0.087)  (0.085) 
 
Unadjusted  quality score published before t 
Not available    0.976   
    (0.228)   
Most negative    1.116   
    (0.069)   
Negative    1.008   
    (0.033)   
Positive    1.022   
    (0.022)   
Most positive    1.097**   
    (0.036)   
 
Final quality score published after t 
Not available      0.807*** 
      (0.041) 
Most negative      0.833 
      (0.106) 
Negative      1.005 
      (0.024) 
Positive      1.061** 
      (0.022) 
Most positive      1.014 
      (0.113) 
       
Observations  213,933  670,272  670,272 
R2 overall  0.30  0.46  0.46 
 
- Additional controls include: distance from home address, distance rank dummies, the percentage of students from cultural minorities, the 
total number of students that attended the school at t-3, the total number of first year students at t-3, the number of branches the school 
management operated at t-3 and the percentage of students in each school track at t-3. 
- Standard errors of coefficients between parentheses and * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.   37 
5.3  Discussion 
In this subsection, we discuss the similarities and differences between the school level analysis 
and the individual level analysis in the Trouw quality response estimates. Table 5.6 summarizes 
the baseline results found for both strata, in terms of the additional number of students that 
enroll at a particular school track in the year after the Trouw publication. The school level fixed 
estimates in the first column are directly copied from Column (I) in Table 5.1. Column (II) 
depicts additional results from a similar regression that is estimated using OLS rather than fixed 
effects. The individual level estimates shown in the third column are calculated using the odds 
ratios from Column (I) in Table 5.3 and the average number of students per quality score 
category from Table 3.1.  
Table 5.6 demonstrates that in both strata we have found significant effects in the expected 
direction of publicly available school quality scores. Individual students and their parents 
respond to quality information and schools notice the net effect of these responses in the 
number of new first year students they receive. In this sense, the estimates of the school level 
analysis and the individual level analysis reinforce each other. However, we also observe two 
differences. First, the size of the effects is larger when analyzing the individual data and when 
using the school level data to estimate OLS results. Second, only in the school track fixed 
analysis we find a significant effect on student inflow for schools performing most positively 
(“++”). 
Obviously, some of the dissimilarities between the individual and school-level effects stem 
from the different time spans covered in the two datasets. The school level analysis uses school 
track information from 1996-2003 (published in 1998-2005) while in the individual analysis we 
focus on students entering secondary education in 2003. Individual estimates may also differ 
from the results in column (I), because we are better able to control for confounding factors 
using a fixed effects methodology. This notion is confirmed by inspecting the OLS estimates 
for the school level data. As these are very close to the individual level estimates, this suggests 
that confounding factors indeed generate most of the differences between the individual and 
school level results. Reputation is the leading example here. As schools with a good reputation 
often perform well quality wise, reputation determines part of our estimates of the Trouw scores 
in the individual analysis. Stated differently, in the individual analysis the Trouw score 
estimates may be interpreted as proxies for the overall reputation effect on school choice, rather 
than as the isolated impact of the Trouw publication. 
Omitted variables that are negatively correlated with the Trouw scores produce an 
underestimation of the effect of scoring most positively (“++”) in the individual and OLS 
analysis. This is due to the specific procedure Trouw uses to correct its final scores for the 
initial quality of students. As explained in Section 2, the most important variable that Trouw 
controls for is the percentage of students from cultural minorities. Schools that have many of 
these students are believed to be at a disadvantage, such that their final scores are upgraded to a   38 
certain degree. The average percentage of immigrant children is thus relatively high in the 
group of school tracks that performs most positively (“++”). One could imagine some omitted 
variables that make a secondary school less attractive to be positively associated with this high 
percentage (like a negative reputation or a low quality of facilities). These confounding factors 
could then lead to an underestimation of the “++”-score effect in the individual analysis, 
whereas they are controlled for in the school fixed effects analysis.  
Table 5.6  Comparison fixed effects school level results and conditional logit individual level results 
  (I)  (II)  (III) 
Response in number of students  School level data  School level data  Individual level data 
       
Estimation method  Fixed effects  OLS  Conditional logit 
       
Final quality score published after t       
Most negative  − 2.279  − 16.941***  − 15.834** 
Negative  − 1.885***  − 7.436***  − 8.760*** 
Positive  1.207*  3.762**  7.128*** 
Most positive  7.729*  3.962  5.658 
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6  Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine school choice responsiveness to information on high school quality 
published by a national newspaper (‘Trouw’). So far, the literature on school quality 
information has focused on government accountability programs targeted at low-performing 
schools and on countries where either school catchment areas exist, or where there is substantial 
heterogeneity in school fees. We contribute to the literature by analyzing a private initiative to 
disclose quality information that covers the entire quality distribution of schools in a country 
with free school choice and negligible school fees. Moreover, we argue that we identify a causal 
effect of the quality information on school choice, due to a substantial lag between the 
registration of quality information and its publication. 
Our analysis uses both a longitudinal school level dataset and an individual level dataset of 
secondary school students with detailed information at the level of students’ households. First, 
we study the causal effect of quality scores on the influx of new high school students in the 
panel dataset of schools. School (track) fixed effect regressions are estimated of the number of 
new first year students at each school on the quality scores published by Trouw during the 
previous year. We find that students and parents do pay attention to the quality information. 
Negative (positive) school quality scores decrease (increase) the number of students choosing a 
school in the year after publication. The size of these effects is typically small, except for the 
effect of receiving the most positive score (“++”) for academic school tracks (‘VWO’). The 
inflow of first year students at an academic school track goes up by 16 to 18 students after the 
track has received this quality score. 
Second, we study individual school choice behavior to address the relative importance of the 
quality scores and the potential differences in the quality response between socio-economic 
groups. For this purpose, we run conditional logit regressions of school choice on the set of all 
relevant school tracks within 20km of the child’s home address. Besides Trouw’s quality scores, 
the independent variables in these regressions include distance from home, distance rank order 
of the school, number of students and other school track characteristics. Although we find the 
probability of attending a school to be affected by its quality score, this probability is mainly 
driven by the traveling distance. Students are willing to travel an estimated 222 meters more in 
order to attend a well-performing rather than an average scoring school. 
Like in the school level analysis, students who attend an academic school track show the 
highest inclination to attend a well-performing school. This difference in quality response could 
be either driven by differences in cognitive ability   which determine each student’s school 
track   or by socio-economic differences. In regressions that include interaction terms of the 
quality scores with several household characteristics, we cannot find significant differences in 
quality response between specific socio-economic groups. This indicates that the Trouw score 
response is larger for students that attend the most academic school track because of differences 
in cognitive ability and ambition.    40   41 
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Appendix 
      Figure A          Excerpt from Trouw school quality publication in 2005 
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Figure B         Time line publication of public quality information 
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Table A  Interaction coefficient estimates of additional conditional logit regressions in individual level analysis 
  (V)  (VI)  (VII)  (VIII) 
Dependent variable  School choice 
within 20 km 
School choice 
within 20 km 
School choice 
within 20 km 
School choice 
within 20 km 
         
Selection  All first year 
students 
Students in most 
academic track  
(VWO) 
Students in middle 
academic track 
(HAVO) 
Students in lowest 
general track 
(VMBO-gt) 
         
Interactions with negative quality score (“ –”) 
Low income household                        Reference 
Middle income household  0.059  − 0.122  − 0.039  0.187 
  (0.07)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.11) 
High income household  − 0.012  − 0.278  − 0.154  0.218 
  (0.08)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.12) 
Native Dutch household                        Reference 
Immigrant household  0.082  0.145  0.174  − 0.008 
  (0.06)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
Wage receiving                        Reference 
Entrepreneurial household  − 0.010  − 0.154  − 0.057  0.102 
  (0.06)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
Benefit receiving household  − 0.121  − 0.217  − 0.127  − 0.014 
  (0.12)  (0.30)  (0.22)  (0.16) 
         
Interactions with positive quality score (“+”) 
Low income household                        Reference 
Middle income household  0.102  − 0.103  0.108  0.219* 
  (0.06)  (0.16)  (0.12)  (0.10) 
High income household  0.053  − 0.201  − 0.053  0.297** 
  (0.07)  (0.16)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
Native Dutch household                        Reference 
Immigrant household  − 0.054  − 0.160  − 0.174  0.116 
  (0.06)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
Wage receiving                         Reference 
Entrepreneurial household  − 0.020  0.015  − 0.101  − 0.010 
  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09) 
Benefit receiving household  0.076  − 0.231  0.031  0.174 
  (0.12)  (0.26)  (0.23)  (0.16) 
         
Observations  670,272  194,834  184,655  290,783 
R2 overall  0.46  0.46  0.47  0.46 
   
- Additional controls include: Trouw quality scores, distance from home address, interactions with distance and the above characteristics, 
distance rank dummies, the percentage of students from cultural minorities, the total number of students that attended the school at t-3, 
the total number of first year students at t-3, the number of branches the school management operated at t-3 and the percentage of 
students in each school track at t-3. 
- Standard errors between parentheses. 
- * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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